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1 Introduction
The motivation behind transfers from parents to grown children has impor-
tant implications for public policy. Central to the discussion is the ques-
tion of whether parents behave according to the altruism model. Do they
act compensatory towards their children and divide transfers unequally be-
tween children with diﬀerent needs? Empirical analyses find weak support
for the predictions of the altruism model and that parents often transfer
equal amounts to their children. How should one interpret this finding?
One would reasonably assume that most parents are essentially altruistic
towards their children in the sense that they care about their children’s wel-
fare and consumption possibilities. However, it is also reasonable to assume
that they would like to treat their children fair. If equal sharing is a fairness
norm in the society, parents will have to weigh their "pure altruism" against
the equal division norm. In this case findings of equal division should not
necessarily be interpreted as evidence of absent altruism.
Here we explore the hypothesis that parents are faced with a trade-oﬀ
between compensating the less well-oﬀ children and the desire to treat their
children fair. A modified version of the "pure altruism" model (Barro 1974;
Becker 1974; Becker and Tomes 1979) is used as a theoretical underpinning
for the empirical analysis. Parents are assumed to also act in response to an
equal division fairness norm, where unequal division aﬀects parents’ utility
directly. The trade-oﬀ will then be determined by the relative strength of
the altruism motive and a fairness norm. Such reasoning leads to at least
two testable hypotheses. First, the degree of income compensation should
be stronger in one-child families since the fairness norm would not apply
in these families. Second, we expect the altruism motive to dominate the
fairness norm when income diﬀerences between siblings are large.
To test these hypotheses we employ a rather rich dataset on inter vivos
transfers between generations in Norway. The strength of our data is that
the respondents are asked about characteristics regarding both their children
and parents. This enables us to both study the relationship between the
respondent and his parents (if they are still alive) and the respondent and
all his (grown) children. Furthermore, the characteristics of children can be
used for sibling comparisons. Both data sets are employed in testing the
above conjectures, employing a Tobit model approach. The respondents are
also asked directly about their transfer motives, and these responses are also
reported.
When we employ standard analysis of inter vivos transfer behavior we
find estimates of the transfer-income derivatives not far from the results
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reported in Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997) with respect to the U.S.
However, we also find that the recipient income derivative is significantly
higher in one-child families than in multiple child families. Furthermore, the
income derivative in multiple child families is non-linear, with a larger degree
of parental compensation of income when the child’s income is lower than
mean or median income. Finally, in a comparison of sibling characteristics,
it is economic situation that seems to be the main determinant of unequal
division of inter vivos gifts. We take this evidence as supportive of the
hypothesis that parents are faced with a trade-oﬀ between compensating
income and being fair.
Formally our model shares similarities with a number of studies, Menchik
(1988), Wilhelm (1996), Stark (1998), Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000), and
Bernheim and Severinov (2003), in that the models will basically lead to
the same predictions as the model employed here. Wilhelm (1996) is the
only other empirical study, but on bequests instead of inter vivos transfers.
He includes a vector of observable parental characteristics to represent the
psychic cost of unequal division. Stark (1998) introduces negative utility of
unequal division (called relative deprivation) in the child’s utility function,
and the cost is, thus, indirectly included in an altruistic parent’s utility
function. He argues that equal division is consistent with a model where the
cost of unequal division emanates from altruism, rather than competes with
altruism.
A number of recent papers discuss intergenerational linkages through in-
ter vivos giving behavior instead of addressing information on bequests (see
Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ, 1997; Poterba, 2001). The growing aware-
ness of parents’ transfer behavior before death appears to have emerged
because recent findings, for instance from the U.S., suggest that a major-
ity of parents divide their estates equally between children at death, while
inter vivos gift behavior to a larger extent result from parents’ conscious-
ness of characteristics of children (Dunn and Phillips, 1997; McGarry, 1999).
These findings have also prompted explanations in terms of costs of unequal
divisions. Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) assume that the cost of unequal
division is only associated with bequests since these are public informa-
tion, and parents who are worried about their post mortem reputation will
use gifts to treat children unequally, as gifts to a larger extent are private
information. Bernheim and Severinov (2003) develop equal division norm
equilibriums for bequests from altruism, when an element of parental aﬀec-
tion is added, aﬀecting well being of children and observed through parental
transfer behavior.
One reason for using data of inter vivos transfer behavior in the present
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study is that the equal division rule is, in fact, part of public policies in Nor-
way. The Norwegian law of transmission limits parents’ possibilities to dif-
ferentiate between the descendants through bequests, as only one third of the
estate can be transferred according to bequeathers’ preferences. Two thirds
of the estate is reserved for equal sharing between children. This means that
the possibility to discriminate between children through transfers at death
is restricted to only one third of the estate. The same regulations apply to
gifts that are advancements of inheritance, and correspondingly they are an
integrated part of inheritance tax bases. However, the transmission regula-
tions do not apply for other inter vivos gifts. Thus, we expect that parents
who face these restrictive transmission rules and want to transfer resources
to their children in accordance with their preferences, transfer resources to
children inter vivos. Such regulations are part of public policies in other
European countries as well, and hence, will impact on how suitable data are
for testing the altruism motive and other transfer motives.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we provide a more de-
tailed outline of the Norwegian inheritance regulations, while the altruism
model with fairness considerations are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 de-
scribes the data and provides some information with respect to self-reported
motives for transfers to children. The econometric specification and results
are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Norwegian gift and bequest laws
There are at least two sets of laws that impact on transfer behavior of
Norwegian parents; the transmission law and the inheritance tax law. As
emphasized above, the law of transmission between generations regulates
how much scope there is for compensatory activities. It states that children
(or other close relatives) are guaranteed two-thirds of the estate, when the
estate does not exceed 1 million Norwegian kroner (approx. $155,000, Oct.
2005) in value. This appears to be similar to what Arrondel and Lafer-
rère (2001) report to be the case in France, and which they characterize as
”directive altruism”, i.e. a law system that encourages transfers to close rel-
atives. We are aware that transmission laws that are directive with respect
to transfer to children exist in a number of other European countries, among
them Sweden, Denmark and Finland.
More important with respect to empirical analyses of altruism, each child
is guaranteed an equal share of this mandatory transfer to children. If a par-
ent leaves 750,000 kroner, his two children will receive a mandatory share of
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250,000 each, while the bequeather can freely target the remaining 250,000
according to his objectives; to one of them, to charity, etc. Bernheim and
Severinov (2003) argue that the equal division norm follows from an equi-
librium where bequests signalling parental aﬀection aﬀects the subjective
well-being of children. In Norway, the law of transmission regulates the
scope for unequal divisions. This makes Norwegian bequest data less useful
in order to analyze transfer motives, for instance the conjectures of the al-
truism model, as parents may be constrained from carrying out their true
objectives. Parents might also adhere to the equal division rule with respect
to the non-mandatory share as well; the equal sharing rule constituting a
transfer norm. The fact that only approximately 25 percent of the deceased
transfer their assets through a will (The Ministry of Finance 2000) suggest
that a minority of parents act intentionally when leaving bequests.1
We suggest that parents, under such circumstances, will carry out their
intentional transfer arrangements through inter vivos gifts. The law confirms
explicitly that an equal sharing principle does not exist with respect to inter-
vivos transfers that are not advanced bequests. Such inter vivos gifts are also
tax exempt. From a practical and administrative point of view, parents can
transfer about 40,000 Norwegian kroner (approx. $6,200) per year without
creating any suspicion from the tax authorities, according to tax-law experts.
Inter vivos gifts that are considered advancement of inheritance are both
part of the tax base and restriced by transmission laws. However, the real
distinction between taxable inter vivos gifts and non-taxable inter vivos gifts
is defined by the intention of the donor.
The inheritance tax is progressive and based on aggregated values of
taxable gifts and bequests, see Appendix A for a more detailed outline of
the tax scheme. There are reasons to assume that the progressive inheritance
tax also strengthen incentives to divide bequests equally. Therefore, in light
of these regulations, both the law of transmission and the tax law, we believe
that is advantageous to exploit information from inter vivos transfers instead
of utilizing information from bequests and taxable inter vivos transfers, when
discussing to what extent altruism act as a guideline for intergenerational
transfers in Norway. These transfers hold the promise of being unpolluted
both by the regulations of the law of transmission and tax law concerns.
1This is about the same magnitude as reported from the U.S., see e.g., Menchik (1988);
Wilhelm (1996).
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3 The model
The altruism model (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1979)
has been at the heart of recent empirical investigations of transfer motives,
see Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997) and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001).
Here we present a modified version of the model which incorporates a fairness
norm of equal sharing, see Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) for a related setup.
Altruistic parents derive positive utility from own consumption, cp, and their
children’s consumption, where ci is the consumption of child i and n is the
number of children, but they dislike unequal sharing of gifts,

bi − b¯

, where
bi is the gift to child i and b¯ is the sibling average. Consumption of parents
and children, respectively, can be seen as
cp = ep −
n[
i=1
bi (1)
and
ci = ei + bi, i = 1, ..., n, (2)
where ep is parental earnings, and ei is earnings of child i. Assuming log lin-
ear parental utility and introducing a parameter measuring an equal division
attitude we get
U = ln cp + α
[
i
ln ci −
[
i
γ
2

bi − b¯
2
. (3)
The optimization problem can then be formalized as
max
bi
U = ln
#
ep −
[
i
bi
$
(4)
+α
[
i
ln (ei + bi)−
[
i
γ
2

bi − b¯
2
,
subject to bi ≥ 0. To illustrate the implications of this model, consider the
first order conditions in the case of two children:
(b2 − b1)

1 +
2γ
α
(e1 + b1) (e2 + b2)

= e1 − e2 (5)
If there is no fairness attitudes (γ = 0) then
b2 − b1 = e1 − e2 (6)
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This is the standard result of the altruismmodel. Parents treat their children
symmetrically, and taking the ei’s as given they balance their gifts in order
to equalize children’s consumption, net of transfers2. However, if γ > 0 then

1 +
2γ
α
(e1 + b1) (e2 + b2)

> 1
and
b2 − b1 < e1 − e2 (7)
i.e. parents will compensate less than in the case where they did not have a
negative utility of dividing unequally. The larger the ”fairness” parameter
γ is, compared to the ”altruism” parameter α, the less they compensate
income gaps between children. These results are easily generalized to the
case with more than two children. It follows from the model that transfers
increase in parents’ income
∂bi
∂ep
> 0. (8)
When it comes to the prediction that transfers are decreasing in the child’s
income
∂bi
∂ei
< 0, (9)
we assume that this depends on the relative strength of γ and α. Generally,
(9) would hold in cases were there is no fairness considerations, for example
when there is an only child.
Moreover, most empirical analyses of the standard model of altruism
focus on the transfer-income derivative restriction,
∂bi
∂ep
− ∂bi
∂ei
= 1 (10)
It states that if transfers are positive, a small change in the income distrib-
ution, such that parents income increase by one unit and the child’s income
is reduced by one unit, will be cancelled by the altruistic parents through a
transfer of one unit. However, as it has been a focal point of many previ-
ous analyses, see e.g., Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1997) and Laitner and
Ohlsson (2001), we also adress this derivative restriction and its components
in the empirical analysis in the following.
However, the main focus will be on the following two predictions of this
modified altruism approach: Firstly, the degree of income compensation
2 It is important to recognise that parents may well end up at a corner solution, where
bi = 0.
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should be stronger in families with an only child, and secondly, the ”pure
altruism” motive will dominate the fairness norm when income diﬀerences
between siblings are large.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper uses very rich data from a survey conducted by Norwegian Social
Research (NOVA) in the winter of 2001. The survey is intended to be
nationally representative and the sample selection uses two-stage stratified
random sampling. The number of households interviewed is 2025, but in
this study we only use households where one of the household heads were
interviewed. This leaves us with a sample of 1877 households.
The survey collected information on household and individual charac-
teristics, wealth, income, employment status, and a number of questions
regarding attitudes to intergenerational relations. Both transfers given and
transfers received were collected with a recall period covering the previous
12 months. All financial figures can therefore be taken to be in 2000-prices.
The survey also has information about educational attainment, economic
situation and other characteristics of the interviewed member’s parents, in-
laws, and grown children.
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, we use two sub-samples of
the basic sample. One sample is confined to all respondents with grown chil-
dren. Here the dependent variable is transfers given in the last 12 months
by the respondent household to their children. Each child-parent pair repre-
sents one observation, which implies that the number of observations in this
sub-sample is greater than the number of respondents. We will have detailed
information about the donor, and indicator information about each recip-
ient. The second sample consists of all respondents with at least one live
parent. The dependent variable is transfers received in the last 12 months,
and we have detailed information about the recipient, but only indicative
information about the donor. Of course, some of the interviewed households
may be in both sub-samples. Descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples
are reported in table 1 and table 2.
A gift is defined as any money transfer, payment of regular or extra-
ordinary expenses, payment of travels/holidays, interest on loans or down
payments on loans, and financial support through transferring cars/housing
or in other ways allowing the children to make free use of cars/housing. Ac-
cording to table 1, a fraction of 23 percent of households with grown children
have given gifts to their grown children in the last 12 months. The condi-
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for respondents with grown children
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Parent characteristics
Age of respondent 61 12 22 97
Married/cohabitant .68 .46 0 1
Female respondent .56 .49 0 1
High education∗, father .47 .50 0 1
High education∗, mother .43 .49 0 1
No of children 3.0 1.4 0 9
Household income∗∗ 347 198 0 1200
Respondent’s income∗∗ 205 131 0 1150
Household net worth∗∗ 1729 1537 -245 11400
Yes, given gift last 12m .23 .42 0 1
Gift given last 12 m∗∗ 12 153 0 5000
Gift given∗∗ > 0 67 355 1 5000
Child characteristics
Age 43 10 18 73
Female .49 .50 0 1
Married/cohabitant .63 .48 0 1
High education∗ .33 .47 0 1
Grandchildren .56 .50 0 1
Unemployed .18 .45 0 1
Student .15 .36 0 1
Economic situation: bad .06 .23 0 1
Economic situation: well .43 .49 0 1
∗ High education is college/university degree
∗∗ In 1000 kroner
Number of observations = 2021
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for respondents with live parents
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Parent characteristics
Father’s age 65 11 38 105
Mother’s age 65 12 35 101
Married/cohabitant .51 .50 0 1
High education∗, father .41 .49 0 1
High education∗, mother .32 .46 0 1
Number of children 3.3 1.6 0 12
Yes, received gift last 12m .19 .36 0 1
Gift recieved last 12 m∗∗ 12 225 0 7500
Gift recieved∗∗ > 0 76 556 1 7500
Child characteristics
Age of respondent 38 10 18 74
Married/cohabitant .70 .45 0 1
Female respondent .55 .50 0 1
High education∗ .42 .49 0 1
Grandchildren .56 .49 0 1
Unemployed .16 .36 0 1
Student .13 .34 0 1
Economic situation: bad .10 .29 0 1
Economic situation: well .54 .49 0 1
Household income∗∗ 421 282 0 6600
Respondent’s income∗∗ 244 135 0 1200
Household net worth∗∗ 1290 1234 -740 13020
∗ High education is college/university degree.
∗∗ In 1000 kroner
Number of observations = 1263
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Table 3: Parents’ attitudes to inter vivos transfers
What kind of economic obligation do you think
parents should have towards their grown children?
All parents Donor parents
Only in emergencies .68 .64
Education, house and family formation .26 .33
Same living standard .04 .02
When parents that have more than one child give economic support,
how do you think they should divide the resources?
All parents Donor parents
Equal sharing .73 .67
According to need .23 .29
To the most helpful child .01 .02
To the most able child .00 .01
No of observations 1512 348
tional average value of these transfers is 67,000 kroner, although if we exclude
four high values above 1 million, this figure is reduced to 30,000 kroner. For
comparison, the average value of parent household income is 347,000 kroner.
Table 2 shows that 19 percent of households with live parents report that
they have received gifts in the last 12 months. The conditional average value
of these gifts is 63,000, and again, if we exclude three high values above 1
million the figure is 22,000 kroner. In both samples, 80-85 percent of the
amounts are lower than 40,000 kroner, which we previously argued would
be the unoﬃcial lower limit of a gift that would have to be reported to the
tax authorities.
4.1 Reported attitudes
Some of the questions in the survey concern attitudes towards intergenera-
tional transfers and motives for transfers. Such evidence is also reported by
Light and McGarry (2004). Since our claim is based on an assumption about
the parents’ attitude to fairness, it is relevant to see what they answered to
such questions. The question ”what kind of economic obligation do you
think parents should have towards their grown children?” can be related to
the degree of altruism since the possible answers ranged from ”they should
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be helped only in emergencies” to ”they should be helped so that they may
attain the same living standard as their parents”. It is interesting to note
that the creators of the survey did not even consider the answer ”they should
not be helped” as an option, and the non-response to the question is low.
As shown in Table 3, a majority of the parents answer that children should
only be helped in emergencies. The group of parents actually transferring
resources to their children is identified as donor parents and the table shows
that they are somewhat more inclined to answer that children should receive
help for education, house purchase and family formation, but the diﬀerence
between donors and the rest is small.
In the present study we employ information on gifts given in the last 12
months. Parents are also asked qualitative questions about whether they
have ever given a) support for education, b) support for housing purchase,
or c) an advancement of inheritance. Questions like these open up a new set
of problems since the answer will depend on the parents’ age (advancement
of inheritance in particular), so the information that these questions provide
will just be used incidentally. From these questions we find that 50 percent
of all parents have given support for education and 26 percent have helped
with a house purchase. Comparing these figures with the 26 percent who
believe that children should get support for education, there seems to be a
discrepancy between opinion and action.
A question that connects to the to the equal division issue is: ”When
parents that have more than one child give economic support, how do you
think they should divide the resources?” Table 3 shows that equal sharing
between children is the view taken by the majority. Very few answer that
the most helpful child or the most able/talented child should get the larger
transfer. Although a sizeable fraction believes that a larger transfer should
be given to the child who needs it most, we consider the responses to imply
that equal sharing is the general norm of fair division. The donor parents are
also asked about the actual division of the gifts. Among parents with more
than one child, 45 percent believed they had shared equally between them.
Calculations of actual behavior show that about 30 percent of the cases were
cases of approximate equal sharing. Again there is a discrepancy between
ideas and action. This brings us to the conclusion that equal sharing often is
the stated norm, but might be diﬃcult to uphold in practice, when you are
faced with the needs of your children. The next sections will probe deeper
into this issue.
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5 Econometric specification and results
In this section we explore the determinants of the transfer amount in the
form of a transfer function, using the two datasets above. Since neither of
the subsamples have exact information on income and wealth in both parent
and child household at the same time, we employ indicators when detailed
information is missing. We estimate the function on both samples in order
to compare results and assess the eﬀects of employing proxies for income and
wealth. It follows from Section 3 that a general specification of the transfer
function is
bij = g(e
p
j , ei,X, uij) i = 1, ...,N ; j = 1, ..., P ;
where bi is the transfer to child i, ei is the recipient/child income, e
p
j is the
donor/parent income, X is a set of controls describing both donor and re-
cipient household characteristics that contribute to determine transfer flows,
and uij is the error term. There are N number of children and P (< N)
number of parents in the data, which means that some children link up
with the same parents. Some variables may be used to proxy permanent
income, such as educational level, while proxies for transitory income may
be information about the child being unemployed or a student.
As is apparent from Table 1 and Table 2, more than two thirds of the
surveyed households neither gave nor received transfers during the surveyed
year. It follows from the model in Section 3 that parents may very well
end up in a corner solution with transfers equal to zero. A part of the zero
observations may be explained by this, but another part may be due to
the survey design, covering gifts made or recieved in the last 12 months,
only. In other words, zero transfer observations include parents who will
make or have made a transfer in other periods and families in which parents
who will never make transfers or children that might never receive transfers.
Regardless of the explanation, ignoring the presence of the large number
of zero values will result in biased inference, similar to what occurs under
censoring. Here we use a Tobit model to account for the presence of non-
participant households when analyzing the transferred amount:
b∗ij = η1e
p
j + η2ei +Xβ + uij (11)
where
bij =

b∗ij if b
∗
ij > 0
0 if b∗ij ≤ 0
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and b∗ij is the latent transfer to child i. The corresponding Probit is reported
in Appendix B.
5.1 Determinants of inter vivos gifts
Table 4 reports the Tobit estimates for inter vivos gifts in the last 12 months,
measured in 1000 kroner. The first four columns show results of the esti-
mation when exploiting parental level information in data. In the last two
columns it is the grown child that is the unit of observation.
We find a significantly negative eﬀect of recipient income on the amount
of inter vivos gifts. This confirms the standard hypothesis that a child
with low income will receive a larger transfer from his/her parents than
a child with high income, all other things equal. We have also tried to
replace the child’s household income with household income per person,
but this does not alter results. Furthermore, parents’ income and wealth
have the expected positive sign. However, the size of the coeﬃcients are
small, especially compared to the hypothesis that a units increase in parental
income combined with a units decrease in child income should yield a transfer
response of one unit, or
η1 − η2 = 1.
This is the socalled transfer-income derivative; the focal point of several em-
pirical analyses (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ, 1997; Laitner and Ohlsson,
2001). According to the results in Table 4 the two would sum to 0.09 [0.05-
(-0.04)] which is far from 1. Shortly, we will return to this estimate when we
examine if the transfer derivative of recipient income in one-child families
deviates from estimates of larger families, because of fairness considerations.
Let us first consider the eﬀects from other variables. The transfer declines
as the parent household ages, where age is set equal to the mother’s age in
a two parent households. It makes no diﬀerence for the results whether
we consider the child’s age or the parent’s age. Descriptive statistics show
that transfers are smaller and more frequent when children are younger, and
conversely larger and less frequent when parents and children are older.
It seems to be of little importance for the size of a transfer whether there
are one or two persons in the parent household, since the dummy for the
parents being a couple has a coeﬃcient that is both small and insignificant.
However, two parents’ household income is normally larger than the income
of an one parent household, and this eﬀect is apparent in column three,
where the dummy for two parents is rendered positive and significant when
the parents’ household income is omitted from the regression. Similarly, we
know that the level of parents’ education correlates with household income.
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Table 4: Tobit results for inter vivos gifts in 1000 kroner
Donor households Recipient hh.
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Parent characteristics
Household income* .050 .021 — — — —
Household net wealth* .011 .002 — — — —
Age -.407 .423 -.477 .351 -.715 .247
Couple 2.60 13.3 38.3 11.2 -2.56 6.07
Number of children -14.6 2.81 -15.7 2.56 -4.43 1.71
College/university, father 11.9 7.64 21.3 7.20 22.1 5.28
College/university, mother 10.6 8.21 22.6 7.83 12.0 5.42
Child characteristics
Household income* — — — — -.041 .015
Female -6.59 6.29 -4.11 5.94 -1.29 4.65
Couple .752 13.1 -3.28 12.1 -5.41 6.07
College/university 15.8 6.88 21.1 6.57 9.40 4.90
Grandchildren -8.13 8.14 -12.5 7.69 -4.08 5.10
Unemployed 19.1 14.1 14.5 13.1 3.71 6.44
Student 20.9 8.72 24.6 8.27 12.4 6.15
Economic situation: bad 37.9 10.9 39.1 10.4 1.89 7.16
Economic situation: well -22.8 7.41 -17.2 6.95 -12.1 5.22
Constant -73.2 31.3 -67.8 25.7 22.7 16.3
se 84.4 3.53 85.7 3.49 48.8 2.81
Log likelihood -2333.4 -2553.2 -1254.9
PseudoR2 0.05 0.04 0.04
Number of obs. 1667 2016 1105
* in 1000 kroner
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These variables also become more important when income and wealth is
omitted. High education of both mother and father has a significant eﬀect
on the size of a transfer, but note that the eﬀect of having a mother with
high education is stronger than that of a father with high education in the
dataset where the child is the unit of observation.
Not surprisingly, the size of the transfer declines with the number of
children, or the number of potential recipients. The proxies for the child’s
permanent income, such as being a couple/married and having completed
higher education (previous versions of the model included a dummy for
homeownership, but this variable proved to be consequently insignificant),
does not seem to aﬀect the chance of getting a transfer, in particular, after
controlling for household income.
5.2 The transfer derivative with fairness considerations
Let us now return to the transfer-income derivative. In section 3 we proposed
an alternative model where parents with more than one child faces a trade-oﬀ
between compensating one child’s income and being fair by giving equally
to all children. It follows that we expect the income compensation to be
smaller in families with two or more adult children than in families where
there is only one child. In other words, parental altruism is more purely
described in one-child families, since these parents do not have to struggle
with the equal division norm.
In Table 5 we present the results that follow from running regressions
separately for families with an only child and for families with two or more
children, using the recipient data set. We remember from Table 4 that the
overall estimate was -.04. Table 5 shows a big diﬀerence in the estimated
transfer derivative, dependent on number of children; -.27 for one-child fam-
ilies, while only -.03 for children with siblings. The diﬀerence between the
two is also significant at a 5 percent significance level. This confirms that
a child can expect more income compensation from his/her parents when
the child has no siblings, which indicates that there is a equal division norm
working, competing with "pure" altruistic motives.
Although the estimated transfer derivatives for recipient income shows
some interesting diﬀerences depending on the number of children, one should
note that the number of observations is low in the sub-sample of one-child
families. Note also that all other explanatory variables are insignificant in
the regression reported in the first two columns, except recipient income and
the dummy for high education of mothers.
17
Table 5: Tobit results for inter vivos gifts by number of children
Two or more
Only child children All.
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Parent characteristics
Age -.039 .616 -.880 .237 -.715 .247
Couple 22.3 16.8 1.71 4.98 -2.56 6.07
Number of children — — -4.26 1.91 -4.43 1.71
High education, father -6.42 13.5 23.9 5.67 22.1 5.28
High education, mother 44.5 16.4 9.69 5.79 12.0 5.42
Child characteristics
Household income* -.266 .089 -.034 .016 -.041 .015
Female -2.61 14.1 -1.94 4.91 -1.29 4.65
Couple 19.7 22.5 -6.94 6.39 -5.41 6.07
High education 24.1 14.2 8.79 5.20 9.40 4.89
Grandchildren 11.4 16.2 -4.56 5.36 -4.08 5.10
Unemployed 12.3 24.8 4.39 6.74 3.71 6.44
Student -1.49 18.4 13.2 6.49 12.4 6.15
Economic situation: bad -42.1 26.8 4.59 7.51 1.89 7.16
Economic situation: well -7.69 16.9 -10.9 5.52 -12.1 5.22
Constant 6.90 47.5 25.5 17.2 22.7 16.3
se 31.4 6.16 49.7 2.99 48.8 2.81
Log likelihood -85.6 -1163.3 -1254.9
PseudoR2 0.11 0.04 0.04
Number of obs. 64 1041 1105
* in 1000 kroner
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Figure 1: Fitted spline for inter vivos gifts by recipient household income
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5.3 A non-linear response to child income?
As stated above, parents that weigh altruism against equal division consider-
ations, might be involved in unequal gift behavior when diﬀerences between
children exceed a certain level. In other words, parents will only compensate
a child if his or her income is substantially below the sibling average. This
leads us to believe that we will primarily find compensating transfers below
a certain level of children income. Graphically we investigate this hypothesis
by using a semi-parametric regression method, which has the advantage of
not imposing any restrictions on the functional form when relating income
to gift amounts. The profile in Figure 1 is a fitted spline to the variable
recipient household income, while the parametric part of the equation con-
sists of the other variables in the model. According to the figure, inter vivos
gifts seems to be negatively related to household incomes lower than 500,000
kroner, and approximately flat or zero for incomes above that level. If we
compare this to the average income in recipient households, which is 420,000
kroner in the sample, we see that a child’s income is negatively related to
transfers when the child has lower than average income.
The plot in Figure 1 indicates that the transfer derivative could be ap-
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Table 6: Tobit results with non-linear transfer response to income
Two or more children
Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Low household income∗ (<250) -.167 .056
Medium household income∗ (250-550) -.083 .035
High household income∗ (>550) -.009 .066
Other controls as in table 3 & 4 yes
se 49.88
Log likelihood -1186.15
PseudoR2 0.04
Number of obs. 908
* in 1000 kroners
proximated by a piecewise linear function, where the transfer derivative is
allowed to change at the lower quartile (250,000 kroner) and the upper quar-
tile (550,000 kroner) of the recipient income distribution. Table 6 shows the
results of replacing recipient income with the piecewise linear function de-
fined as
low income =
ei if ei ≤ 250
250 if ei > 250
medium income =
250 if ei ≤ 250
ei if 250 < ei ≤ 550
550 if ei > 550
high income =
550 if ei ≤ 550
ei if ei > 550
The sample used is child respondents with siblings and the other variables
are the same as in Tables 3 and 4. Given the size of the standard errors, the
estimated coeﬃcients for the three income segments in Table 6 are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from each other. Yet, they strongly suggest non-linearities
in the transfer derivative; -0.17 for low-income households and zero for high-
income households. Alternatively, we could have chosen median household
income as the knot. The estimated transfers derivatives would then have
been -.10 (.02) for incomes lower than the median and -.02 (.03) for incomes
above the median (with standard errors in parentheses). For incomes above
the mean or median income in the sample, the relationship between gifts
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and income is not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Cox, Hansen and Jimenez (2004) also find a non-linear relationship, but
they present a diﬀerent interpretation; they argue that exchange motives
dominate altruism above a threshold level. Here, the interpretation is that
parents with more than one child face a trade oﬀ between a child’s need and
the fairness norm of sharing equally. When the income of the child is above
average, we assume that the economic situation of the child is suﬃciently
good, and parents may combine being altruistic and being fair at the same
time.
5.4 Sibling comparisons
Furthermore, one of the advantages of the data we have at hand is that
the relationship between unequal treatment and the level of income can be
examined by comparing siblings directly. While we in the two previous sub-
sections used the subset of data where the child was the unit of observation,
and where we had detailed information about the child’s income, here we
employ data with parents as the respondents. This enables us to exploit
information on transfers from parents to siblings to address the question of
income diﬀerences and transfers.
In the previous subsections we were forced to evaluate the child’s in-
come in relation to the overall sample mean or median, since we had no
information about the income of the child’s siblings. Here, we use detailed
information of transfers together with indicator information about the eco-
nomic situation of children in a family. The empirical model is

bi − b¯

= γZp + βk (xki − x¯k) + εi, (12)
where

bi − b¯

is child i’s transfer measured as a deviation from the total
sibling mean, Zp is a set of controls concerning the parents’ characteristics,
and the xk’s are diﬀerent indicator variables describing the child’s economic
situation. We denote these variables with subscript k as these variables are
derived from information about siblings, choosing one child as the reference.
Some of these variables are dummy variables, such as the existence of grand-
children, sex (where 1 denotes female), and being a student or unemployed.
Taking diﬀerences yields variables that range from 1 to -1. Education is
reported at three levels, primary school, high school and college/university.
Economic situation assessed by the parents also takes on three values (bad,
ok, good). In order to evaluate our results in light of an alternative hypoth-
esis about inter vivos gifts; the exchange motive (Bernheim, Shleifer and
Summers, 1985; Cox, 1987), we have also included variables for the degree
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Table 7: Deviation from sibling average and probabilty of unequal sharing
Tobit Tobit Probit
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Parent charcteristics
Age -.012 .170 — — -.025 .009
High education, father 4.01 3.04 4.54 4.10 .132 .159
Household income∗ .022 .008 .031 .010 -.147 .046
Number of children -3.26 2.00 -5.47 2.71 .591 .135
Sibling diﬀerences
Age -1.15 .510 -1.64 .636 — —
Sex -4.28 3.44 — — — —
Educational level 6.71 3.48 7.57 4.60 — —
Grandchildren 1.22 4.29 — — — —
Economic situation -17.8 4.01 -23.0 5.32 — —
Student -.047 3.79 — — — —
Unemployed 6.51 3.03 8.08 3.79 — —
Contact with parents 2.78 2.30 3.10 3.06 — —
Service provided -11.2 6.94 -15.7 9.31 — —
Constant -33.1 13.2 -42.3 9.30 .998 .691
se 18.2 1.93 24.7 2.56
Log likelihood -377.2 -403.6 -198.2
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.09 0.08
No of observations 853 912 355
∗ in 1000 kroners (in 100,000 in the Probit equation)
of contact between parents and child and services provided. The degree of
contact range from 1 to 5 and the higher the value, the more contact, while
service levels can take three values where 1 is none, 2 is some and 3 is often.
Table 7 shows the result of a Tobit based on equation (12). For compar-
ison we also include a Probit, in which the dependent variable is
Prob

bi − b¯

9= 0|b¯ > 0 .
Adressing the Tobit results first, we see that the only variable that signif-
icantly determines unequal sharing of gifts (at the 5 percent level) is the
child’s relative economic situation and unemployment status. Parents give
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more transfers to a child that has a relatively unfavorable economic situa-
tion, or to a child that is unemployed when the other siblings are not. Thus,
these results support that there are altruistic motives among parents, in ac-
cordance with results presented above. Information based on siblings holds
the promise of describing such relationships very accurately.
At a lower significance level we find that older children get less than their
younger siblings and that higher education seems to pull in the direction of
higher than average transfers. This result remains even if all students are
taken out the sample. In previous sections we found that students receive a
significant amount of income compensation, but the results in Table 7 imply
that being a student does not influence parents to share unequally between
their children. There is a lower correlation between student status and the
parents’ evaluation of economic situation than one might expect. The same
goes for unemployment, and it reflects that the individual situation of the
child may not always be representative for the child’s household situation.
Finally, results reported in Table 7 suggest that a child that have frequent
contact with his or her parents does not receive a larger transfer than a
child that has infrequent contact. Remarkably, it seems that a child that
provides more services to the parents than a brother or sister actually gets
less transfers, although the eﬀect is only significant at a 10 percent level.
The controls for parent characteristics may be diﬃcult to interpret since
one parent has given characteristics, and if he gives more than average to one
child he must necessarily give less than average to another child and the total
eﬀect of parent characteristics on the deviation may be unclear. Therefore
we also present Probit results in Table 7: the probability of unequal sharing
conditional on a gift being given as a function of parent characteristics. We
find that the probability of unequal sharing is significantly declining with
age and income and increasing with the number of children.
6 Concluding remarks
Information on the transfer behavior of Norwegian parents is important
from a public policy perspective, not the least since a recent tax commisson
(The Ministry of Finance, 2003) has suggested eliminating wealth taxation
in Norway and amplifying the role of the gift- and inheritance tax. As
discussed, for instance by Gale and Slemrod (2000) and Kaplow (2001), an
inheritance tax is expected to distort behavior when parents are altruistic. If
parents behave in accordance with the altruism model, there are reasons to
assume that taxes on intergenerational transfers will reduce donors’ savings
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(Kotlikoﬀ and Summers 1981; Kopzcuk and Slemrod 2001) and discourage
their work eﬀorts. No such harmful tax eﬀects on donors’ behavior exist if
bequests are unintended, that is, follow from death before donors have been
able to consume all their wealth (Davies 1981).
In this perspective it is of key importance to have information on the
degree of altruism among parents. Here we present the hypothesis that
parents are faced with a trade-oﬀ between compensating income and being
fair. As evidence we find that the recipient income derivative is significantly
higher in one-child families than in multiple child families. Furthermore,
the income derivative in multiple child families is non-linear, with a larger
degree of parental compensation of income when the child’s income is lower
than mean or median income. Also, in a comparison of sibling character-
istics, it is economic situation that seems to be the main determinant of
unequal division of inter vivos gifts. This means that usual estimates of
average transfer-income derivatives are in danger of concealing important
indications of parental involvement. The evidence presented here indicates
that Norwegian parents are more concerned about children’s utility than
revealed by traditional measures. This analysis therefore suggests that av-
erage measures of the transfer-income derivative might suppress important
evidence of altruistic behavior.
We would also like to point out that Norwegian transmission laws have
had strong eﬀect on our choice of empirical strategy, i.e., that we employ
information on non-taxable inter vivos transfers. Such considerations might
be relevant for data analyses based on information from other countries
as well, where data are obtained from individuals under similar type of
environments. Finally, we need to emphasize that we focus on financial
transfers from parents to children in this analysis. A more comprehensive
approach should bring in other types of transfers and permit transfers going
in both directions; also from children to parents.
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A The Norwegian inheritance tax system
The aggregation of gifts and bequests to establish the tax base is in ac-
cordance with the taxation of bequest in a number of other countries, as
Sweden, France, U.K, and the U.S. Spouses are considered as two donors,
which means that the value of an asset that is owned by both parents (matri-
monial asset) is divided into two parts, one for each parent, when calculating
the tax base. As the statutory tax rate system is progressive this is advan-
tageous for the tax-paying child. As shown in Figure 1 the inheritance tax
rate scheme (at the time of data collection) implies that inheritances below
200,000 kroner (approx. $23,000 in 2000) is tax exempt, while a two-tier
rate system applies to inheritances above that, commencing at a rate of 8
percent, while transfers above 500,000 kroner ($57,000) are taxed at a rate
of 20 percent. This scheme also applies to parents of the deceased.
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The figure also shows that the rates for other relatives and other heirs
under a will are 10 percent and 30 percent in the two brackets, respectively.
Inter-spousal gifts and bequests are not taxed.The general valuation rule is
that assets should be valued at the market value. However, there are some
important exemptions. For non-listed shares and interests in partnerships,
firstly, the value of the company is calculated by excluding values of most
intangible assets, as goodwill, by setting real estate values very low, and,
secondly, only 30 percent of the total value is included in the tax base. The
main purpose of this rule is to facilitate the transfer of family businesses.
Moreover, as taxation in most cases is based on values reported by tax-payers
to tax authorities, there are incentives to report low values.
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B Probit results
We use a standard Probit model to account for participation
Pr (bi > 0|X) = Φ (η1ep + η2ei +Xγ) + εi
where εi ∼ (0, 1). The functional form and explanatory variables correspond
to the Tobit in equation (11) and table (4).
Donor households Recipient hh
Marg. Marg. Marg.
eﬀect∗ S.E. eﬀect∗ S.E. eﬀect∗ S.E.
Parent characteristics
Age -.003 .001 -.004 .001 -.004 .001
Couple .026 .036 .105 .025 .012 .022
Number of children -.053 .009 -.050 .007 -.019 .007
Household income∗∗ .026 .008 — — — —
Household net wealth∗∗ .003 .000 — — — —
High education, father .048 .028 .078 .025 .044 .027
High education, mother .126 .029 .147 .026 .047 .029
Child characteristics
Female -.022 .021 -.025 .018 -.009 .022
Couple -.053 .043 -.067 .038 -.028 .029
Household income∗∗ — — — — -.020 .007
High education .016 .023 .154 .022 .046 .024
Grandchildren -.012 .027 -.030 .023 -.033 .024
Unemployed .051 .046 .043 .040 .022 .033
Student .121 .036 .132 .032 .104 .040
Economic situation: bad .271 .059 .245 .051 .062 .040
Economic situation: well -.073 .022 -.047 .020 -.067 .025
E Pr [bi > 0] .200 .191 .180
Log likelihood -723 -879 -441
PseudoR2 .22 .20 .15
Number of obs. 1671 2021 1108
∗ Marginal eﬀect for dummy variables is a discrete change from 0 to 1
∗∗ In 100 000 kroner
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